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FAIR TRIAL v. UNFAIR ADVERTISING: JURY AWARD ADVERTISING
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
During the late 1970's, three of the nation's largest liability insurance
carriers--Aetna Life & Casualty Company (Aetna), Crum & Forster Insurance
Companies (Crum & Forster) and The St. Paul Companies, Inc. (St. Paul)-
launched a controversial multi-million dollar advertising campaign 2 in the print
media 3 expressing their views on "America's dis-tort-ed tort law system."4 In
1. In 1977, Aetna was the nation's third largest property-casualty underwriter with net pre-
miums of nearly three billion dollars. Standard & Poor's, Insurance, in Industry Surveys 1-15
(1979) (excludes life insurance premiums). Crum & Forster was the nation's fourteenth largest
property-casualty underwriter that same year with net premiums of $1.3 billion, id., and St. Paul
was the nation's sixteenth largest property-casualty underwriter with net premiums of one billion
dollars. Id. See generally Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks
(S. Berkson ed. Wint. 1978-79). Liability insurance "[rlefers to the form of coverage whereby the
insured is protected against injury or damage claims from other parties [or any) form of coverage
whereby the insured is protected against claims of other parties from specified causes.... The
insured's liability for damages under such claims may arise from his negligence or through the
operation of law or a contract." L. Davids, Dictionary of Insurance 150 (1977); see Glossary of
Insurance Terms 86 (R. Osler & J. Bickley eds. 1972).
2. The budget for Aetna's campaign alone was reported at $5.5 million. See Insurance-Company
Ads Draw Trial-Lawyer Fire, 64 A. B.A.J. 531 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Trial-Lawyer Fire J;Aetna's
Tampering With Juries, Lawyers Charge, Bus. Ins., Jan. 23, 1978, at 18 [hereinafter cited as Lawyers
Charge];Lawyers Retaliate Against Aetna's Ads, Bus. Week, July 31. 1978, at 39 (hereinafter cited as
Lawyers Retaliate]. At least one source placed the total amount spent on the campaign at $10 million.
See Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A.J. 68, 69 (1979).
3. The advertisements were published in Black Enterprise, Business Week, The Columbia
Journalism Review, Editor & Publisher,,Forbes, The Hartford Courant, National Review, New
Republic, Newsweek, The New York Times, New York Magazine, Reader's Digest, Smithso-
nian, Sports Illustrated, Time, U.S. News & World Report, The Wall Street Journal and The
Washington Post. Adman on a Hot Seat, Media Decisions, Oct., 1978, at 132 (hereinafter cited as
Adman]. At least one insurer-advertiser considered airing its advertisements on television but
ultimately rejected the idea. Id. at 71, 132 (interview with Douglas J. Alspaugh, Director of
Advertising, Aetna Life & Cas. Co.). Undoubtedly, one reason for this decision was the
undesirable possibility of triggering the Federal Communications Commission's fairness doctrine.
See id. See generally S. Sethi, Advocacy Advertising and Large Corporations 8 (1977). Under the
fairness doctrine, a broadcaster is required to provide opposing viewpoints when he airs
advertisements that "consist of direct and substantial commentary on important public issues."
Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the
Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 22 (1974); see, e.g., Energy Action Comm., Inc., 64
F.C.C.2d 787 (1977); Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494 (1976). See generally Comment,
Problems in the Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Commercial Advertisements, 23 Vii. L.
Rev. 340 (1978); Note, Advocacy Advertising: A Question of Fairness and the Reasonable Agency,
27 Cath. U.L. Rev. 785 (1978). Finally, even if the insurer-advertisers had chosen to run their
advertisements on television, it is possible that the networks would have refused to air them. See
Adman, supra, at 132. CBS, for example, "abides by a long-standing policy prohibiting the sale of
advertising time for the presentation of viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance."
E. Heighton & D. Cunningham, Advertising in the Broadcast Media 283 (1976); see S. Sethi,
supra, at 92-94. See generally Zabel, Accountability in Corporate Communications, in Crosscur-
rents in Corporate Communications 47, 52 (1976); O'Toole, Advocacy Advertising-Act 11, in
Crosscurrents in Corporate Communications 33, 33 (1975).
4. Newsweek, Feb. 13, 1978, at88-89 (Aetnaadvertisement); Newsweek, Jan. 30, 1978, at 12-13
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one set of advertisements5 the insurer-advertisers communicated their belief
that jury awards in personal injury lawsuits were often excessive. 6 In addi-
tion, they suggested that such excessiveness had and would continue to result
in higher insurance premiums for everyone. 7 For example, a St. Paul adver-
tisement asked readers: "You really think it's the insurance company that's
paying for all those large jury awards?" St. Paul went on to answer its own
question: "When awards are out of line, everyone pays more. In the form of
higher insurance rates." 9
(same); Time, Feb. 20, 1978, at 88-89 (same); see Newsweek, Dec. 5, 1977, at 74-75 (Aetna
advertisement); Newsweek, Nov. 7, 1977, at 16-17 (same); Time, Nov. 21, 1977, at 26-27 (same);
Time, Oct. 24, 1977, at 10-11 (same). For example, one advertisement read: "THE JURY SMILED
WHEN THEY MADE THE AWARD. THEY DIDN'T KNOW IT WAS COMING OUT OF
THEIR OWN POCKETS. They thought they were giving away the insurance company's money. So
it wouldn't hurt to be generous. Because insurance companies can afford to pay big awards. All they
have to do is collect higher insurance premiums. From you. And excessive awards eventually cost you
money. We don't object to paying fair awards. That's our business. But paying exaggerated awards
inflates costs. And can affect your insurance in other ways. Insurance companies might be forced to
limit the kinds of coverage or the number of policies they write. Insurance, after all, is simply a means
of spreading risk. Insurance companies collect premiums from many people and compensate the few
who have losses. The price of insurance must reflect the rising cost of compensating those losses and
the work that goes into doing that. And that includes the escalation in jury awards. That's why
your premiums have been going up." Newsweek, Apr. 12, 1976, at 78 (Crum & Forster
advertisement); Time, May 10, 1976, at 1 (same); see Newsweek, Apr. 18, 1977, at 44 (Crum &
Forster advertisement); Newsweek, Nov. 29, 1976, at 34 (same); Newsweek, Oct. 11, 1976, at I
(same); Time, Nov. 8, 1976, at 15 (same). Another advertisement read: "'WHEN ANYTHING
GOES WRONG FOR ME... SOMEBODY IS GOING TO PAY!' 'THEY OWE MEI' So who Is
this 'somebody?' It's 'somebody' with plenty of money, an unending ability to pay. This 'somebody'
has the responsibility to provide an extra reward to a person for his misfortune. And 'somebody'
makes it easy for us as jurors (and even the judges) to overlook just who it is that's wrong, and
base our decisions on the assumption that any injury or loss (real or imaginary) deserves payment.
And maybe a substantial bonus as well. So who is this benevolent 'somebody?' It's youl This
growing 'they-owe-it-to-me' attitude may be just fine with you. But if you want it to be America's
standard, be prepared to pay the bill. In the form of higher taxes, higher prices for goods and
services, higher medical costs. And, yes, higher insurance rates. So, keep your checkbook handy.
Because insurance is merely a means of spreading risk among many. So, when claims and
settlements go up, rates can only do the same." Newsweek, Feb. 27, 1978, at I (St. Paul
advertisement); Newsweek, Nov. 14, 1977, at 7 (same); Newsweek, Oct. 31, 1977, at 92 (same);
see Time, Aug. 22, 1977, at 76 (St. Paul advertisement).
5. Other advertisements dealt with such issues as medical malpractice, see Newsweek, Sept.
19, 1977, at 86 (St. Paul advertisement); Newsweek, June 14, 1976, at 82 (Crum & Forster
advertisement), arson-for-profit, see Newsweek, June 13, 1977, at 2 (Crum & Forster advertise-
ment); id. at 56 (St. Paul advertisement), product liability laws, see Newsweek, Apr. 18, 1977, at
16-17 (St. Paul advertisement); Time, Sept. 12, 1977, at I (Crum & Forster advertisement), and
similar topics of concern to the liability insurance industry.
6. See Newsweek, Feb. 27, 1978, at I (St. Paul advertisement); Newsweek, Dec. 5, 1977, at
74-75 (Aetna advertisement); Newsweek, Apr. 18, 1977, at 44 (Crum & Forster advertisement);
Time, Feb. 20, 1978, at 88-89 (Aetna advertisement); Time, Aug. 22, 1977, at 76 (St. Paul
advertisement); Time, May 10, 1976, at I (Crum & Forster advertisement).
7. See Newsweek, Feb. 27, 1978, at I (St. Paul advertisement); Newsweek, Dec. 5, 1977, at
74-75 (Aetna advertisement); Newsweek, Apr. 18, 1977, at 44 (Crum & Forster advertisement);
Time, Feb. 20, 1978, at 88-89 (Aetna advertisement); Time, Aug. 22, 1977, at 76 (St. Paul
advertisement); Time, May 10, 1976, at I (Crum & Forster advertisement).
8. Time, Aug. 22, 1977, at 76 (St. Paul advertisement).
9. Id.
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These advertisements outraged many personal injury plaintiffs and their
lawyers, who accused the advertisements' sponsors of attempting to "brain-
wash"' jurors into minimizing personal injury awards by linking the size of such
awards with the amount of the jurors' own premiums."' Specifically, they
claimed that the advertisements, which were targeted to reach seventy million
potential jurors, 2 prejudiced their right to a fair trial because jurors who had
been exposed to the advertisements would be reluctant to award the plaintiffs
the damages legally due them. 13
In response, the insurer-advertisers denied the charges of jury tampering 4
and asserted that they were simply speaking out on an important public issue:
rising insurance costs. Is Their stated objective was to encourage public discus-
sion that would in turn lead to changes in the tort liability system. 16 Further, they
argued that any ban on the advertisements' 7 would be an unconstitutional
infringement on free speech.' 8
This controversy between the advertisements' sponsors and opponents raises
several new 19 and significant issues .20 The most prominent of these is whether
10. Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 4, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
11. An Aetna advertisement, for example, captioned "[t]oo bad judges can't read this to a jury,"
pictures a judge reading the following jury instruction: " 'When awarding damages in liability
cases, the jury is cautioned to be fair and to bear in mind that money does not grow on trees. It
must be paid through insurance premiums from uninvolved parties, such as yourselves.'"
Newsweek, Dec. 5, 1977, at 74-75. The advertisements' opponents have suggested that the
insurer-advertisers' motive is profit-oriented because "a reduction in jury awards would operate to
the financial advantage of liability insurance carriers." Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., S Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1153, 1155 (W.D. La. 1979). Under this argument, the insurer-advertisers' costs
will be reduced because they will be required to pay out less in awards. Brief for Appellant at 18,
Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
12. See Adman, supra note 3, at 132.
13. Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at4, Quinn v. Aetna Life& Cas. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978); see Lawyers Charge, supra note 2, at 18.
14. "The literature at issue... was not intended to effect improper communications with jurors
or to tamper with juries." Affidavit of Douglas J. Aispaugh, Director of Advertising, Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., at2, Quinn v. AetnaLife & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
15. Id. at 1; see Ad Suit Seen as Free Speech Issue, Nat'l Underwriter, Apr. 28, 1978, at 67
(prop. & cas. ed.) [hereinafter cited as Ad Suit].
16. Pasculli, Lawyers Back Suit Opposing Insurers' Ads, Nat'l Underwriter, Feb. 10, 1978, at 1,
45 (prop. & cas. ed.).
17. Opponents sought a ban on the advertisements from the courts, see, e.g., Naylor v. Case &
McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557 (2d-Cir. 1978); Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1153 (W.D. La. 1979); Parris v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 282, 253
S.E.2d 29, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 455, 256 S.E.2d 808 (1979); Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978), from state insurance commissions, see Trial-
Lawyer Fire, supra note 2, at 531; Lawyers Retaliate, supra note 2, at 39, and from the Federal
Trade Commission. See Pasculli, supra note 16, at 1; Trial-Lawyer Fire, supra note 2, at 531;
Protesting Too Much, Barrons, Feb. 13, 1978, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Protesting Too Much].
18. See Pasculli, supra note 16, at 1; Ad Suit, supra note 15, at 67.
19. Although the conflict between the right to an unbiased jury in a criminal trial and the
guarantee of freedom of the press has been termed "almost as old as the Republic," Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976), the conflict between the right to an unbiased jury in a civil
trial and the guarantee of freedom of speech is comparatively recent. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead,
594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979) (court rule prohibiting extrajudicial comments by attorneys in
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the first amendment prohibits regulation of advocacy advertisements2 1 when the
effect of such advertisements may be to interfere with a civil litigant's right to a
fair trial. A second issue, assuming the first amendment does not prohibit
regulation, centers on the proper method and extent of such regulation.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Current First Amendment Analysis
Until recently, the Supreme Court tested restrictions on advertising against a
primary purpose analysis. 22 Under this approach, if the advertiser's primary
purpose was "commercial," the advertisement was deemed unprotected by the
first amendment,2 3 which was held to protect only purely political speech. 24 As a
result, a door-to-door salesman had no first amendment right to peddle his
goods 25 and a hawker had no first amendment right to distribute handbills on
city streets26 if their primary purpose in doing so was commercial. If, on the other
hand, their primary purpose was noncommercial, both actions would be fully
protected by the first amendment. 27
all civil cases overbroad); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257-59 (7th Cir.
1975) (same), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); cf. CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238 (6th
Cir. 1975) (per curiarn) (court order prohibiting extrajudicial comments by civil trial participants
considered a prior restraint of the press).
20. This controversy has taken on renewed importance as a result of a second campaign recently
initiated by at least one insurer-advertiser. See Newsweek, Feb. 25, 1980, at 12-13 (Aetna advertise-
ment). Although to date these advertisements have not dealt with jury awards, later advertisements
in this new campaign may do so.
21. "(A]dvocacy advertising attempts to tackle controversial issues and presents facts and
arguments that project the sponsor in the most positive light and opponents' arguments in the worst."
S. Sethi, supra note 3, at 8. Advocacy advertising should be distinguished from public service
advertising, which tends to promote general social well-being, product promotions that are
inherently linked to controversial public issues, and corporate image advertising, which is designed
to promote the advertiser's public standing. International Advertising Ass'n, Controversy Advertis-
ing 24-34 (1977).
22. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 768-69 (1978);
Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 40 Ohio St. L.J.
115, 117 (1979); Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 45, 47;
Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doc-
trine, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205, 208 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Doctrine; Note,
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 6 Cap. U.L. Rev. 75, 76 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Virginia Pharmacy);
Note, The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 189, 197-98 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Corporate Image Advertising].
23. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). In Chrestensen, the plaintiff challenged a
New York City anti-litter ordinance that prohibited the distribution of "commercial and business
advertising matter" on the streets of the city. Id. at 53 n. 1. After being prohibited from distributing
such a handbill, he printed a protest message on the handbill's back, Id. at 53. The Court, however,
found that the appended message was printed only to circumvent the ordinance and that the
plaintiff's primary purpose remained commercial. Id. at 55
24. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
25. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951).
26. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
27. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (door-to-door solicitation by
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The demise of the primary purpose test was marked by the Court's landmark
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 28 In New York Times, the plaintiff
in a civil libel action argued that because the newspaper's primary purpose in
selling advertising space to the sponsors of the allegedly libelous advertisement
was commercial in nature, the newspaper was not protected under the first
amendment. 29 The Court, however, rejected the significance of the profit mo-
tive, terming it as "immaterial" as the fact that the newspaper was sold. 30
Focusing instead on the advertisement's content, the Court noted that it con-
tained important information on a topic of public concern. 3 1 As a consequence,
the Court found it deserving of first amendment protection. 32
In Bigelow v. Virginia,33 the Court found that an advertisement for an
abortion referral service provided information of value not only to those women
who may have been in need of the services offered, but also to society as a
whole. 34 Seizing upon this latter value, the Court held that the advertisement
was constitutionally protected under the New York Times rationale, 3" although it
declined to decide whether commercial advertising was to be afforded first
amendment protection under all circumstances. 36 One year later, however,
the Court extended first amendment protection to purely commercial advertis-
ing in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consuner
Council, Inc. 37 There, the Court noted that product and price information
was often as important to the consumer as information contained in tradition-
ally protected forms of speech. 38  Because of this importance, the Court
concluded that such advertising warranted first amendment protection, 39
notwithstanding the advertiser's purely economic motive.4 0
religious group); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115-17 (1943) (same); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (handbill distribution by religious group).
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. Id. at 265.
30. Id. at266;see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150(1959);Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952). See also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966).
31. 376 U.S. at 266, 271.
32. Id.
33. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
34. Id. at 820-22.
35. Id.; see Roberts, supra note 22, at 122; Schiro, supra note 22, at 81-84, The Supreme Court,
1974 Term, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 47, 114 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Terns]; 8 Ind. L. Rev. 890, 894
(1975).
36. 421 U.S. at 825; see Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91-92
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
759-61 (1976); Virginia Pharmacy, supra note 22, at 81; Constitutional Doctrine, supro note 22, at
215.
37. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
38. Id. at 763.
39. Id. at 770;see J. Barron & C. Dienes, Handbook of Free Speech and Free Press § 4:5. at 170
(1979); J. Nowak, R Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 22, at 776-77; B. Schwartz, Constitutional
Law § 8.6 (2d ed. 1979).
40. 425 U.S. at 770; accord, Louisiana Consumer's League, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Optometry Examiners, 557 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1977) (advertising of prescription eyeglasses); Terry v.
California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (advertising of prescription
drugs), aff'd mem., 426 U.S. 913 (1976); Board of Medical Examiners v. Terminal-Hudson Elecs.,
Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 376, 140 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1977) (advertising of prescription eyeglasses).
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Under the Supreme Court's current analysis, therefore, the content of an
advertisement, not the motive of the advertiser, determines whether it is entitled
to first amendment protection. 4 1 If the advertisement contributes information of
value to society--either political or commercial in nature-it should be pro-
tected. 42 The extent of that protection, however, presents a much more difficult
question.
A conclusion that an advertisement's content warrants first amendment pro-
tection is only the initial inquiry required under the current analysis. Once this
assessment is made, it must be weighed, according to the Court, against the
public interest served by the proposed or actual restriction on the speech.43
Under this balancing approach, specific regulations will be valid as applied to
some forms of speech and invalid as applied to others. For example, regulations
designed to prevent deception would be valid as applied to a commercial adver-
tisement for a medical product that made false claims about the product's safety,
because the value to society from false commercial advertising is low and the
interest to society in protecting consumers from health hazards is high. 44 A
similar regulation would probably be invalid as applied to an advertisement
soliciting contributions for a right-to-life or a pro-abortion group.4 5 In this
second situation, the value to society from discussion of important public issues
is greater and the societal interest in preventing misstatements is less than in the
former situation. 4 6 Between these two extremes, however, lie hundreds of
advertisements and only a handful of court precedents.
Two important conclusions with respect to advertising can be drawn from the
recent Supreme Court decisions on protected speech. First, pure commercial
advertising is afforded a lesser degree of protection than that afforded noncom-
mercial advertising. 47 For example, the Court recently sustained a state bar
association rule that prohibited in-person or mail solicitation as applied to a
solicitation that was solely for the attorney's own pecuniary benefit, 48 while
striking down a similar rule as applied to a solicitation by an American Civil
41. See J. Barron& C. Dienes, supra note 39, § 4:4, at 164. In Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court described its analysis: "We have recently held that the First
Amendment affords some protection to commercial speech. We have also made it clear, however,
that the content of a particular advertisement may determine the extent of its protection." Id. at 68
(footnote omitted).
42. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda &J. Young, supra note 22, at 776-77; L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law § 12-15, at 654-55 (1978).
43. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); see 1974 Term, supra note 35, at 119-20. See
also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-43 (1978).
44. See generally Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976); J. Barron & C.
Dienes, supra note 39, § 4:7; Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 22, at 238-40.
45. See J. Barron & C. Dienes, supra note 39, § 4:4, at 163.
46. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See generally Virginia
Pharmacy, supra note 22, at 89.
47. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 716 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-71 & n.24 (1976); id. at 779-80 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 786
(Rehnquist, J., dissentingi.
48. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 458 (1978).
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Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney.4 9 The latter solicitation, the Court found, was
"undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties
objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain.""0 Although on its
face this distinction appears to rely on the former primary purpose test, 5t the
Court in fact employed the content-based balancing approach. -2 It concluded
that although the state's interest in protecting the public from overzealous
solicitations outweighed the value to society from uncontrolled commercial
solicitations, it did not outweigh society's interest in uninhibited political discus-
sion. -
3
Second, the mere assertion that a state interest will be served by a proposed
regulation is insufficient to sustain that regulation. 5' Rather, advocates of the
regulation must be able to prove that it will in fact substantially further the
asserted state interest. 5  For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,- 6 the Court held invalid a state
statute that prohibited the advertising of prescription drug prices because
Virginia failed to show that such a ban substantially furthered its asserted
interest in maintaining the professionalism of pharmacists.s" Similarly, in Lin-
mark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro," the Court struck down an
ordinance that prohibited the placing of "for sale" and "sold" signs in front of
homes because there was no evidence that the ordinance substantially furthered
the township's asserted interest in preventing a racially motivated exodus of
white homeowners from the area.5 9
Restrictions on advertising, therefore, are currently tested through application
of a content-based balancing approach. 60 Under this analysis, the advertise-
ment's content is weighed against the state interest actually furthered by the
49. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978).
50. Id. at 422; see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda& J. Young, supra note 22, at 156 (1979-1980 Supp.).
Although the Court expressly distinguished Primus from Ohralik as to the objectives of each
solicitation, see In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 422, the Court's opinions also reflect its concern with the
manner of the two solicitations. See id.; J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 22, at 156-58
(1979-1980 Supp.).
51. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 28-46 supra and accompanying text.
53. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 458 (1978), id. at 470 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422, 437-38 (1978).
54. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978); Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350, 383-44 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
95-97 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975).
55. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-92 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro. 431 U.S. 85, 95-97
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 769-70 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975).
56. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
57. Id. at 769-70;accord, Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350(1970) (price advertising by attorneys).
58. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
59. Id. at 95-97.
60. See Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 Cal. W. L. Rev 430,440
(1977); Roberts, supra note 22, at 127; notes 28-42 supra and accompanying text.
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proposed regulation. 6' If this state interest outweighs society's interest in the
advertisement's content, the regulation is valid; 62 if it does not, the regulation is
invalid.
63
B. Application of the Content-Based Balancing Approach to Jury Award
Advertising
Insofar as the advertisements address themselves to the problem of runaway
insurance rates, 64 they clearly provide information of value on a topic of
public concern. Some readers, for example, might otherwise be unaware of
the recent rise in the size and number of awards in personal injury cases. 65
Others may not have previously understood, or even considered, the relation-
ship between such awards and insurance rates in general. As a consequence,
these advertisements warrant presumptive protection under the content-based
analysis. 66
Two conflicting considerations enter into a determination of the extent of the
protection to be afforded jury award advertisements. On the one hand, the
advertisements contain noncommercial information of value to society. 67 As
such, the extent of their protection is suggested by the Court's recent opinion in
First National Bank v. Bellotti. 6s In Bellotti, the Court held that the publication
of a corporate-sponsored noncommercial message of public interest could be
prohibited only upon a showing of a" 'subordinating interest which is compel-
ling.' "69 This heightened degree of protection for noncommercial advertise-
ments is primarily grounded on the desire to promote the dissemination of
information, opinions and ideas from as many diverse sources on as many topics
of public concern as possible. 70
61. See Roberts, supra note 22, at 136-37; Virginia Pharmacy, supra note 22, at 86-87; Constitu-
tional Doctrine, supra note 22, at 236-37; notes 43-59 supra and accompanying text,
62. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978).
63. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
64. Affidavit of Douglas J. Alspaugh, Director of Advertising, Aetna Life & Cas. Co., at 2,
Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The
advertisements' sponsors are able to offer an important perspective and unusual insight into any
discussion of the insurance ratemaking process. Cf. Lawyers Retaliate, supra note 2, at 39 (" '[we feel
we have a right and an obligation to publicly comment on issues affecting the rising costs of liability
insurance' ").
65. In 1962, for example, the first million dollar verdict was returned in a personal injury case. In
1976, there were 46 such awards. Protesting Too Much, supra note 17, at 7.
66. In this context, presumptive protection refers to the protection afforded speech before Its
content is weighed against the state interest allegedly served by any regulation of it. See generally
Roberts, supra note 22, at 127-28 & n.81.
67. See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
68. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
69. Id. at 786 (citations omitted).
70. See id. at 777; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). Under traditional
first amendment theory, the central purpose of the amendment is to protect political expression. See
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On the other hand, the advertisements also contain commercial information
inasmuch as they attempt to justify the company's high rates to its policy-
holders. 71 In this regard, their protection would be considerably less.7" It is
clear, however, that the introduction of a commercial element does not, in
itself, reduce the first amendment protection of an otherwise noncommercial
advertisement. For example, in Bigelow v. Virginia,7 3 the Court noted that
even though the advertisement at issue solicited business for a "for-profit"
abortion referral service, this solicitation in no way interfered with, or
otherwise affected, the noncommercial message of the advertisement. 7 4 Be-
cause the commercial element in jury award advertisements is similarly
noninterferential," its introduction does not reduce the first amendment
protection otherwise afforded the advertisements.7 6 Jury award advertising,
therefore, should be suppressed only upon a showing of a compelling or other
similar interest.
Opponents argue that a ban on these advertisements would further such a
subordinating interest: the preservation of a civil litigant's constitutional right to
a fair trial. 77 The advertisements, they contend, threaten that interest by tamper-
First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1. 14 (1976);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S- 254, 269-70
(1964). See also A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948); Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255-57. In addition. it has been
thought to protect the search for truth, see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 881-82 (1963), and the maintenance of self-expression See id. at
879-81. See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U Chi. L
Rev. 20, 25-26 (1975). Ordinary commercial advertising serves none of these purposes. Banzhaf v-
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); see Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 201 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Baker. Commercial
Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1976); Jackson & Jeffries,
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev 1(1979). But
see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S 748. 765
(1976); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 (1971).
71. See 124 Cong. Rec. H3706 (daily ed. May 9, 1978) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce); See also
Kronzer, Jury Tampering-1978 Style, 10 St. Mary's L.J. 399, 413-15 (1979)
72. See notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text.
73. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
74. Id. at 821-22. See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U S. 1. 11 n. 10 (1979) But see Carey v
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 716 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)-
75. Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153, 1l1S5 (W D La 1979) See
also Affidavit of Douglas J. Alspaugh, Director of Advertising, Aetna Life & Cas. Co., at 2.
Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct 1978); Ad Suit,
supra note 15, at 67.
76. See Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153, 1155 (W-D. La. 1979)
77. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 4, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409
N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978). While a civil litigant has no right to demand a jury in a state court
under the seventh amendment, see Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis. 241 U.S. 211. 217(1916);
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1875); Wartman v. Branch 7. Civil Div., County Court. 510
F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1975); Iacaponi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 258 F. Supp. 880. 884 (W.D
Pa. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054 (1968), the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that a jury. when employed, be impartial. See
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ing with the impartiality of juries. 78 If true, such a threat warrants serious
consideration in light of the importance the courts have attached to the mainte-
nance of impartiality. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the very
purpose of the courts is to provide a forum for the resolution of disputes in which
all parties can be afforded the traditional and constitutional safeguards due
them.79 One of these safeguards is the fundamental right to have all decisions
made by "an impartial decision maker."8 0 Without this right, all other procedural
safeguards would be meaningless because the tribunal's decision would not rest
on the evidence adduced at trial but on evidence from some other source. 8
Because the overall fairness of the trial depends upon the maintenance of
impartiality, preservation of neutrality and its concomitant fairness may be a
compelling interest within the meaning of the Bellotti standard.
82
As noted earlier, the first amendment also requires that before speech may be
constitutionally regulated the asserted state interest must in fact be substantially
furthered by the proposed regulation. 83 One corollary to this requirement is the
finding that the challenged speech poses an actual threat to the asserted state
interest. 84 Opponents, therefore, must show that the advertisements are, in fact,
likely to have a serious effect on personal injury plaintiffs' rights to a fair trial.
Recent clinical evidence suggests that jury award advertisements pose a
significant threat to the right to an impartial jury. In 1977, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus
conducted an experiment in which half of her subjects were exposed to one of
these advertisements prior to being asked to sit as mock jurors and award
damages to an automobile accident victim. 85 The subjects who had been exposed
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976). See also Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965).
78. Affidavit of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 2-3, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for
Plaintiff, at 1-4, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545,409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978);
Kronzer, supra note 71, at 407.
79. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting in part); Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
80. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
81. See Patterson v Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
82. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979) ("[olur system of justice
properly requires that civil litigants be assured the right to a fair trial"); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257 (7th Cir. 1975), ("we rightfully place a prime value on
providing a system of impartial justice to settle civil disputes"), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) ("the right to a fair trial, both
in civil and criminal cases, is one of our most cherished values').
83. See notes 54-59 supra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-90 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 367-68 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-97
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
769-70 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975).
85. Loftus, supra note 2, at 69. The 86 people who participated in the experiment were divided
into two equal groups-a control group and an experimental group-and were assigned a number of
"filler activities" to camouflage the purpose of the experiment. In addition to these filler activities,
each group was shown several magazine advertisements. Included in the advertisements distributed
to the experimental group was a St. Paul advertisement entitled "You really think it's the insurance
company that's paying for all those large jury awards?" The next day, the subjects, after again
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to the advertisements awarded a lower amount8 6 than those who had not been
exposed, leading Dr. Loftus to conclude that "a single exposure to one of these
ads can dramatically lower the amount of award a juror is willing to give."8 7 If
verified by further studies,88 this conclusion could arguably withstand the
Court's furtherance requirement.
Finally, opponents of the advertisements must show that no viable alterna-
tives exist that could accomplish the desired result without infringing on first
amendment protections. 89 In meeting that burden, opponents have argued that
traditional trial techniques are ineffective in combating the effect of these adver-
tisements.90 The primary impediment, they argue, is the long-accepted doctrine
that the mere mention of insurance by the plaintiff is grounds for reversal
because it improperly suggests to the jury that the defendant is insured.9'
Relying on this doctrine, a majority of the states that have ruled on the question
prohibit inquiry concerning the advertisements during voir dire. 92 As a result,
plaintiffs' counsel have no opportunity to challenge veniremen who may be
prejudiced as a result of viewing the advertisements. Moreover, even if such
inquiry is permitted, it is likely that it would be counterproductive. Question-
ing about the advertisements may only reinforce their content to the venire-
men.93 For the same reasons, an instruction by the judge to disregard the
advertisements is both prejudicial to the defendant,94 and counterproductive to
participating in a number of filler activities, were presented with information about an automobile
accident and were asked to play the role of jurors in awarding damages to the victim. Id.
86. Dr. Loftus termed this differential statistically "highly significant." Id. See also Hoiberg &
Stires, The Effect ofSeveral Types of Pretrial Publicity on the Guilt Attributions ofSimulated Jurors,
3 J. Applied Soc. Psych. 267 (1973); Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity
on Jurors' Verdicts, in The Jury System in America 125 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
87. Loftus, supra note 2, at 69.
88. It is nearly impossible to determine the overall effect that these advertisements have on actual
personal injury lawsuits. First, any overall increase or decrease in the amount of damages awarded
during any two periods would be inconclusive because it would be subject to many uncontrollable
variables, including inflation, the number of legitimate suits and the quality of representation.
Second, the prohibition in many states against inquiry into this area during voirdire, see note 92 infra
and accompanying text, prohibits specific findings of prejudice which could be extrapolated to show
the overall effect of the advertisements.
89. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). See generally
J. Nowak, R Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 22, at 727-28.
90. Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 4, Quinn v. Aetna Life& Cas. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
91. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 201, at 479 (2d ed. 1972).
92. See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 .F.2d 775, 783 (3d Cir. 1965) (applying Delaware law);
Bartonv. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d484, 508, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 508(1977); Murrell v. Spillman, 442
S.W.2d 590, 591 (Ky. 1969); Farmer v. Pearl, 415 S.W.2d 358,361 (Ky. 1967); Kujawa v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 224 Md. 195, 200-01, 167 A.2d 96, 98 (1961); Butcher v. Main, 426 S.W.2d 356, 360
(Mo. 1968); Maness v. Bullins, 19 N.C. App. 386,387-88, 198 S.E.2d 752, 752-53, cert. denied, 284
N.C. 254, 200 S.E.2d 654(1973); Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20, 22 tTex. Civ. App. 1969). But see
King v. Westlake, 264 Ark. 555, 559-61, 572 S.W.2d 841, 843-44 (1978); Borkoski v. Yost, -
Mont. _, -, 594 P.2d 688, 694-95 (1979); Graham v. Waite, 23 A.D.2d 628, 628, 257
N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (4th Dep't 1965).
93. Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at4, Quinn v. Aetna Life& Cas. Co.,
96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
94. See Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 508, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 538 (1977).
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the plaintiff.95 A sanitized instruction-to consider, for example, only the evi-
dence presented-assumes that the advertisements have only a conscious effect
and would, at most, be of limited use. 96 Finally, techniques such as change of
venue or sequestration of the jury, although effective in criminal trials, 97 would
probably be ineffective when the prejudice results from advertisements distrib-
uted nationally and already seen by most prospective jurors. 98
To date, none of the three courts that have considered the constitutionality of
regulating jury award advertisements has fully and properly applied the
content-based balancing approach. 99 In Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 10 0
95. Cf. Kupferman, The Press, Broadcasting and the Constitution: The First Amendment in the
Era ofMass Communications, 1 Com. & L. 91, 92-93 (1979) (instruction by judge to disregard tile fact
that defendant is insured is counterproductive to defendant).
96. Loftus, supra note 2, at 70;see Kronzer, supra note 71, at 421-22 ("more often than not these
attacks are invidious in that they are calculated to subliminally affect the mind of the targeted person
and only rarely may be recalled even under direct interrogation on the subject'), See also Stanga,
Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 1, 2 (1971).
97. See D. Pember, Mass Media Law 261-66(1977); Comment, Pretrial Publicity, Voir Dire and
a Fair Trial, 21 S.D.L. Rev. 373 (1976).
98. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
99. Additional actions were brought in Naylor v. Case & McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557 (2d Cir.
1978), and Parris v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 282, 253 S.E.2d 29, appeal
dismissed, 297 N.C. 455, 256 S.E.2d 808(1979), InNaylor, the plaintiff sought relief under a recently
enacted Connecticut statute that prohibited false and misleading advertising. 585 F.2d at 558-59.
After removal, the federal district court dismissed the action, holding that the plaintiff had no
standing to sue under the statute. Id. at 559. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the action
should have been remanded to the state court because the case presented questions of first
impression under the state statute and, therefore, the state court was the appropriate forum for
their resolution. Id. at 563-66. In Parris, the plaintiff in a personal injury action sought an
injunction against Aetna, the defendant's insurer. 40 N.C. App. at 283, 253 S.E.2d at 30. Aetna
challenged service of process but the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the service proper
under the state long-arm statute. Id. at 291, 253 S.E.2d at 35 ("Defendant would have us allow it
the benefit and protection of our laws; but deny us the right to assert jurisdiction to prevent
contravention of our laws. We may properly consider our legitimate interest in protecting our
plaintiff residents' rights to have a jury reach a verdict free of outside influence." (citations
omitted)). Litigation that arose from a similar campaign sponsored by the insurance Industry
during the 1950's was similarly ineffective in restraining the advertisements. See, e.g., Hoffman
v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (injunction and criminal contempt citation
denied), appeal dismissed, 222 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1955); United States ex rel, May v. American
Mach. Co., 116 F. Supp. 160, 163 (E.D. Wash. 1953) (civil contempt citation denied); People ex
rel. Barton v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 317, 327-28, 282 P.2d 559, 565
(injunction denied), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 886 (1955); Note, Newspaper Advertising-An Inter-
ference with a Fair Trial by Jury?, 22 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 601, 603-05 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Newspaper Advertising]. These decisions, however, are of minor significance today because they
were decided prior to the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the First Amendment area and
reflect the former protected-unprotected dichotomy. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying
text.
100. 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978). In Quinn, three personal injury
plaintiffs sought an injunction against Aetna requiring it to discontinue its jury award advertise-
ments. Id. at 548,409 N.Y.S. 2d at 474. The court, although finding the advertisements unprotected,
see note 101 infra and accompanying text, denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
because they had failed to meet the burden of proof required for the injunction's issuance. Id. at
559-60, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82.
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for example, a New York state court found that the advertisements contained
false and misleading commercial speech and were therefore unprotected by
the first amendment. 10 This conclusion is inconsistent with a proper application
of the content-based test. Even if the court found the advertisements to be
primarily commercial, such content should only diminish, not eliminate, their
public interest value. 102 In contrast, the federal district court to which Quinn
was eventually removed10 3 ruled that the advertisements contained fully pro-
tected political speech. 10 4 Although the court enunciated a content-based test, 105
it did not elaborate upon its superficial conclusion that the speech was protected.
In Rutledge v. Liability Insurance Industry, 106 however, a federal district court
in Louisiana both enunciated and applied the content-based test to the adver-
tisements. After noting that "[s]peech is not stripped of First Amendment pro-
tection merely because it is made in the form of a paid advertisement [or
because] it reflects the advertiser's commercial and financial interest,"' 1° the
court explained that the advertisements should be protected notwithstanding
their "commercial aspect"' 0 8 because they contained important information and
opinions on a topic of public concern. 10 9
No court has yet properly applied the second requirement of the test-the
balancing process-to the advertisements. The state court in Quinn, operating
from the premise that the speech was unprotected, had no occasion to employ
it. 0 Both federal district courts, on the other hand, assumed that because the
speech was protected it could not be constitutionally enjoined."' Because of
101. The court found the advertisements to be misleading in that they suggested that jury awards
are often excessive and unwarranted without disclosing that truly excessive or unwarranted awards
may be set aside or reduced. Id. at 554, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478; see Kronzer, supra note 71, at 413,
Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 3, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co-, 96
Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
102. See notes 67-76 supra and accompanying text.
103. When the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, it also dismissed
the action against two magazine publishers that had run the advertisements and had been named as
defendants. 96 Misc. 2d at 559-60, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 482. This dismissal created complete diversity
among the parties. Seizing upon this, Aetna removed the action to the federal district court
Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 482 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd per cunarn, 61t
F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980).
104. Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 482 F. Supp. 22, 29-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd per
curiam, 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. "The degree of protection afforded the expression is not lessened by the fact that it is
contained in a paid advertisement, or that the speaker is a corporation rather than a natural person."
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
106. 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153 (W.D. La. 1979). In Rutledge, an attorney who regularly
represented personal injury claimants on a contingent fee basis sought to enjoin liability insurers as a
class from sponsoring jury award advertisements. Id. at 1154.
107. Id. at 1155.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The court did, however, note that it believed that the advertisements had an adverse effect
on jurors, that such effect was not remote, and that it could not be cured by voir dire. 96 Misc- 2d at
558-59, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82.
111. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 482 F. Supp. 22, 29-31 tE.D.N.Y 1979), aff'd per
curiant, 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980); Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 5 Media L. Rep (BNA)
1153, 1155 (W.D. La. 1979).
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their reliance on this protected-unprotected dichotomy, they made no attempt to
balance the value of the advertisements' contents against the right to a fair
trial. 1 2 The proper balancing of these factors might well have led to the
conclusion that the advertisements could be subject to some form of constitu-
tionally legitimate regulation.
II. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REGULATION OF JURY AWARD
ADVERTISEMENTS
If jury award advertisements are not totally protected against regulation, the
problem of defining the proper method and extent of such regulation remains.
Because of its traditional exercise of jurisdiction over advertising,"13 and be-
cause of the failure of alternative means, 114 the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) is the proper source of such regulation. ' 15 The FTC has a broad statutory
112. Contrary to the state court opinion in Quinn, both federal district court opinions suggest
that alternative measures are available to control the advertisements' effects. See Quinn v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Co., 482 F. Supp. 22, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("voir dire, proper jury instructions, and
the jurors' oath'), aff'd per curiam, 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980); Rutledge v. Liability Ins.
Indus., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153, 1155 (W.D. La. 1979) ("[vloir dire, jury instructions and
other safeguards").
113. The original Federal Trade Commission Act gave the FTC the power to regulate "unfair
methods of competition." Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)). Despite the lack of any express reference in the Act to
advertising, the FTC asserted jurisdiction over the practice almost immediately. See, e.g., Block
& Co., 1 F.T.C. 154 (1918); A. Theo. Abbott & Co., I F.T.C. 16 (1916); Yagle, I F.T.C. 13
(1916). This asserted jurisdiction was upheld on the grounds that unfair advertising had an
adverse effect on competition and was, therefore, an unfair method of competition under the Act.
See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922). In 1931, however, the Supreme
Court held that advertising that did not in fact have an adverse effect on competition was not
within the FTC's jurisdiction. See FTC v. Raladan Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646-50 (1931). In
response, Congress amended the Act to give the FTC explicit jurisdiction over not only "unfair
methods of competition," but also "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," Wheeler-Lea Act, ch.
49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)); see Sabatino, Federal
Government Agency Activities in Consumer Protection from Deceptive Advertising, in Consumer
Protection From Deceptive Advertising 2, 3 (F. Stuart ed. 1974), thereby firmly establishing the
FTC's authority to regulate advertising. See Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation
Rule, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8348-55 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Basis].
114. Although two state insurance commissions have prohibited the further use of two jury
award advertisements that contained false statements, see Geiel, Insurer Agrees to Avoid Deceptive
Ads, Bus. Ins., July 24, 1978, at 9; see generally Geisel, Horror Story Ads Untrue?, Bus. Ins.,
Oct. 31, 1977, at 1, 66; Kronzer, supra note 71, at 409-10; Adding Insult to Injury, 43 Consumer
Rep. 412, 414 (1978), no state insurance commission has otherwise acted to prohibit the use of
jury award advertisements despite numerous requests to do s. See Trial-Lawyer Fire, supra note
2, at 531; Lawyers Retaliate, supra note 2, at 39. Opponents have been similarly ineffective in
their attempt to have the advertisements enjoined by the courts. See, e.g., Naylor v. Case &
McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1978); Quinn v. Aetna Life & Co., 482 F. Supp. 22
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir 1980); Rutledge v. Liability Ins.
Indus., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153 (W.D. La. 1979); notes 99-112 supra and accompanying
text; cf. Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
(inadequate showing made to support preliminary injunction).
115. When the advertisements first appeared in 1976, the FTC declined to act on them,
stating: "The Commission's position is that advertisements which elicit primarily a political
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mandate under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the Act) to
prevent "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. '"" 6 Until
recently, however, the FTC has tested advertising only against the Act's decep-
tive standard and not against its unfairness standard. 117 In fact, the first judicial
endorsement of the unfairness doctrine did not come until 1972, when the
Supreme Court, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,' 18 considered a Fifth
Circuit ruling that the FTC's antitrust powers were limited to proscribing either
a per se violation or a violation of the spirit of the antitrust laws. 1"9 In describing
the FTC's powers, the Court explained that the "Federal Trade Commission
does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the
elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or
encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws."' 20 To guide both the FTC and
the lower courts, the Court listed three factors that should be considered in
determining whether a contested act or practice is unfair, including
"(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlaw-
ful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or
response rather than an economic one are entitled to protection under the First Amendment. In
view of these First Amendment considerations, the staff is not prepared to recommend that the
Commission take action with respect to thtese] advertisement[s]." Letter from Richard B. Herzog,
Ass't Director for Nat'l Advertising, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, to Morris Brown,
Esq. (June 4, 1976) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). See generally FTC Staff, Statement
of Proposed Enforcement Policy Regarding Corporate Image Advertising 21 (Dec. 4, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as FTC Proposed Policy], reprinted in Subcomm. on Administrative Practice &
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Sourcebook on Corporate
Image and Corporate Advocacy Advertising 1487, 1507 (Comm. Print 1978) (hereinafter cited as
Sourcebook]. Inasmuch as this position concludes that political speech can never be regulated, it
reflects the now outmoded protected-unprotected dichotomy. See pt. I(a) supra. The FTC should
therefore not consider itself bound by the strictures of its earlier-and possibly incorrect-
decision.
It should be noted that Congress has legislated that the Federal Trade Commission Act, along
with the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976),
applies to the "business of insurance" only to "the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law." McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, §§ 1-5, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-1015 (1976)); see Section of Antitrust Law, ABA, Antitrust Law Developments 396-98
(1975). In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has severely limited this statute's applica-
tion. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), for example, the Court held that the
"business of insurance" meant only the "contract of insurance" between the insurer and the
insured. Id. at 460. Because the effect of these advertisements is to prejudice the rights of
personal injury plaintiffs who are not parties to the contract of insurance, these advertisements
clearly do not fall within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
116. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)l(1) (1976).
117. Hobbs, Unfairness at the FTC-The Legacy of S&H, 47 Antitrust L.J. 1023, 1024 (1978);
Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC Approach, 1 Fordham Urb L J. 349, 352
(1973); Cohen, The Concept of Unfairness as it Relates to Advertising Regulation, J. ,Marketing,
July, 1974, at 8; Comment, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act-Unfairness to
Consumers, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 1071, 1071 [hereinafter cited as Consumer Unfairness].
118. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
119. See Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 1970), modified, 405
U.S. 233 (1972). See generally Consumer Unfairness, supra note 117. at 1080-84.
120. 405 U.S. at 244 (footnote omitted).
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otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consum ers . ... I 21
It is clear, however, that even when an advertisement is analyzed in light of these
factors, the S&H decision leaves the FTC with a great deal of latitude in defining
an unfair act or practice. 122
Application of the S&H criteria to jury award advertising indicates that such
advertising may fall within the unfair practice category. It has been suggested,
for example, that these advertisements offend the clearly established public
policy against jury tampering. 123 Although there has been no proof that the
insurer-advertisers actually intended to influence the outcome of a specific
action, as required under jury tampering statutes, 124 there is an "inescapable
implication" that the advertisements were designed to influence jurors and
prospective jurors. 125 As a result, they fall at least within the penumbral prohi-
bition of such statutes.
The second S&H criterion requires that the advertisements be " 'immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.' "126 Opponents have suggested that
these advertisements meet this requirement in two respects. First, they argue
that the insurer-advertisers, the real parties in interest in many personal injtlry
lawsuits, are engaging in unethical conduct by trying their cases in the media
with inadmissible evidence. 127 Just as plaintiffs are prohibited from suggest-
ing to a jury that a defendant is insured, defendants are prohibited from
suggesting that any award given to the plaintiff will financially affect the
jurors.128 By making these suggestions out of court, in an attempt to avoid
121. Id. n.5 (quoting Statement of Basis, supra note 113, at 8355).
122. See E. Kintner, A Primer on the Law of Deceptive Practices 104-05 (2d ed. 1978);
Comment, Psychological Advertising: A New Area of FTC Regulation, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 1097,
1106-11. In Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972), the commissioners noted that an "unfairness analysis
... will permit a broad focus in the examination of marketing practices. Unfairness is potentially
a dynamic analytical tool capable of a progressive, evolving application which can keep pace with
a rapidly changing economy." Id. at 61 (footnote omitted). See also FTC v, Standard Educ.
Soc., 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.) (the FTC's "duty ... is to discover and make
explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the community may
progressively develop"), rv'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). Although S&H involved the
commission's antitrust powers, as opposed to its advertising powers, it is considered valid
authority for both areas of the FTC's jurisdiction. See Thain, supra note 117, at 372; Note,
Fairness and Unfairness in Television Product Advertising, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 498, 527 n.161
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Television Product Advertising].
123. Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 2, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas.
Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
124. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2615 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-609 (1973); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1266 (1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 524.090 (1975); N.Y. Penal Law § 215.25
(McKinney 1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 946.64 (West Supp. 1979).
125. Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 556, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473, 480 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
126. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
127. See Affirmation of Martin L. Baron, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 4, Quinn v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
128. Kronzer, supra note 71, at 407 & n.43.
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the traditional prohibition against such statements, the insurer-advertisers are
arguably engaging in unethical conduct. Second, the opponents argue that the
advertisemeits are oppressive because the assertions made in them cannot be
effectively challenged, either in or out of court, by those with opposing views.
Opponents cannot contest the advertisements' statements in court due to the
traditional prohibition against the mention of insurance;1 29 they cannot con-
test them out of court because no individual plaintiff can effectively match the
$10 million spent on the campaign by the insurer-advertisers. 130 The insurer-
advertisers have therefore used their wealth to place their speech beyond
challenge. 131
Finally, the S&H test requires that the advertisements cause " 'substantial
129. See notes 90-98 supra and accompanying text.
130. Kronzer, supra note 71, at 408. In addition, counteradvertising by the bar is impractical
because many members of the bar are defense attorneys and "a counter-adverti-ement would not
be to their best interest." Newspaper Advertising, supra note 99, at 607
131. Such one-sidedness has already been recognized as unfair in another context In its
Cigarette Rule, the FTC noted: "The cigarette industry's massive, continuous. mounting, and
forceful advertising, coupled with the refusal to acknowledge or take any steps to inform the
consuming public of the hazards to health, has blunted public awareness and appreciation of
these hazards ...." Statement of Basis, supra note 113, at 8357. The FTC noted that although
counteradvertisements were being sponsored by various groups, the overkill of the cigarette
industry advertising cancelled out any real effect these public service messages might have Id at
8360-61.
The jury award advertisements' oppressiveness may also reduce their first amendment pro-
tection. Language in the Court's decision in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
can be construed as meaning that, notwithstanding the value of speech's content, its overall
standing in the first amendment hierarchy may be lowered when it threatens to "drown out other
points of view." Id. at 789. When this happens the speech may, in the Court's words. "denigratle)
rather than serv[e] First Amendment interests." Id. This language may reflect the Court's
recognition of the failure of the marketplace theory in this area- Under that theory, government
intervention is normally unnecessary because the marketplace of ideas is self-correcting See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("the purpose of the First Amendment
[is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail").
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) t"the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"j, Coase,
Advertising and Free Speech, in Advertising and Free Speech 1. 25 (A. Hyman & M. Johnson
eds. 1977). See also Rosenfeld, The Jurisprudence of Fairness: Freedom Through Regulation in
the Marketplace of Ideas, 44 Fordhan L. Rev. 877 (1976). This theory assumes, however, "that
all speakers will have roughly comparable power, resources and access to audiences-" Address by
Tracy Weston, Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, Brooklyn Law School
and Brooklyn Law Review Symposium on Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, at 7
(Nov. 10, 1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). This assumption is not always true,
especially when one party to a controversy is a large corporation. Id. at 23-27; see Energy and
Environmental Objectives: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1974) (pt. 2) (statement of Lester G. Fant); 42 Tenn. L.
Rev. 573, 582-83 (1975). See generally L. Tribe, supra note 42, § 12-1, at 576-77 When this
assumption is not met the marketplace theory fails and the government must step in to prevent
domination of the marketplace and its attendant harms. Cf. Banzhaf v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1082,
1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (fairness doctrine), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) See also J
Hohenberg, A Crisis for the American Press 224-25 (1978). Because the Bellotti Court, however,
did not believe that such domination had been shown, it did not elaborate on its remark
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injury to consumers.' "132 It is helpful to divide this third requirement into two
components. The first is that of substantial injury. As mentioned earlier, it is
impossible to determine the actual number of plaintiffs who have been injured by
these advertisements. 133 It is similarly impossible in many cases to determine the
actual number of consumers who have been injured by deceptive product
advertising. 134 As a result, it is well settled that such evidence is not required to
support FTC action. 135 It is sufficient that the challenged advertisement tends to
have a harmful effect on an "appreciable" number of people as determined from
all the available facts. 136 Because these advertisements were designed to be read
by seventy million people, 137 many of them jurors and potential jurors, it is
arguable that they are likely to have a harmful effect on an appreciable number
of people. Second, this third criterion refers to injury" 'to consumers.' "138 The
term "consumers," however, is overly restrictive inasmuch as modern advertis-
ing is often directed at much larger audiences. 139 For example, corporate image
advertising 40 is directed not only at consumers but at stockholders and other
investment groups, banks and other financial institutions, prospective employ-
ees, suppliers, and government regulators.' 4 1 To regulate such modern ad-
vertising techniques effectively, therefore, the FTC must not be handcuffed
by a requirement of direct injury to "consumers. 14 2 Instead, it should be able
to protect any identifiable group that is threatened with substantial injury
from an unfair advertisement.' 4 3 In the case of jury award advertising, the
132. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
133. See note 88 supra.
134. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 Hare. L. Rev. 1005, 1040 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Deceptive Advertising]. See also Comment, Deceptive Advertising and the
Federal Trade Commission: A Perspective, 6 Pepperdine L. Rev. 439, 460-65 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Advertising Perspective].
135. See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944);
Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941); Providence
Washington Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 345, 377 (1977); E. Kintner, supra note 122, at 96; 2 G. Rosden
& P. Rosden, The Law of Advertising § 18.01 (1979).
136. Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 892 n.19 (9th Cir. 1960).
137. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
138. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 2,14 n.5 (1972).
139. See Address by Lewis A. Engman, FTC Chairman, to the Antitrust Section of the State
Bar of Michigan (Feb. 15, 1974), reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,200, at 55,376-77.
140. "[Clorporate image advertising is that type of advertising by a business which creates in
the mind of the public a favorable image of the advertiser but does not espouse the merits of'the
advertiser's product or service and is thus not related directly to the product and/or service from
which the advertiser derives its income." Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, Corporate Image Advertis-
ing: A Discussion of the Factors that Distinguish Those Corporate Image Advertising Practices
Protected Under the First Amendment From Those Subject to Control by the Federal Trade
Commission, 51 J. Urb. L. 405, 406 (1974); see Ludlam, Abatement of Corporate Image
Environmental Advertising, 4 Ecology L.Q. 247, 251-55 (1974).
141. See FTC Proposed Policy, supra note 115, at 2-10, reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note
115, at 1488-96; Dennison, Corporate Image Advertising and the FTC, in Crosscurrents in
Corporate Communications 40, 42-43 (1973); Ludlam, supra note 140, at 255-60.
142. See Ludlam, supra note 140, at 273.
143. See Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, supra note 140, at 415; Corporate Image Advertising,
supra note 22, at 216-17.
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identifiable group consists of potential personal injury plaintiffs. Jury award
advertisements thus appear to meet all three requirements of the S&H test.
The second jurisdictional requirement under the Act is that the unfair act be
"in or affecting commerce."'1 4 4 In S. Klein Department Stores, Inc., 145 the
respondent challenged the FTC's jurisdiction over its interstate advertising,
arguing that the FTC was limited to regulating advertising that resulted in
interstate sales. 146 The FTC rejected this argument and held that it had
jurisdiction whenever the business engaged in interstate advertising for com-
mercial purposes. 147 The statutory requirement that the jury award adver-
tisements be "in or affecting commerce," therefore, is met if the advertise-
ments serve a commercial purpose. Opponents argue that the advertisements
serve such a purpose in two ways. First, the advertisements attempt to
increase the sponsors' profits by reducing the amount the insurer-advertisers
must pay out in awards. 148 Second, the advertisements serve to "sell" the
companies' high rates to their policyholders by explaining that the high rates
are inevitable under the present tort system.149 Thus, it would appear that
jury award advertising, disseminated in interstate commerce for a commercial
purpose, also falls within the Act's commerce requirement.
144. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). Prior to 1975, the
statute proscribed only acts "in commerce." Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat.
719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)). In 1975, however, Congress amended
the Act to include the "or affecting" language. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)). As a result, the FTC's jurisdiction is now "co-extensive with the
constitutional authority of Congress." H.R. Rep. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7702, 7712; see E. Rockefeller, Desk Book of FTC Practice
and Procedure 33-34 (2d ed. 1976).
145. 57 F.T.C. 1543 (1960), dismissed on other grounds, 60 F.T.C, 388 (1962)
146. 60 F.T.C. at 393.
147. "It is well established that commerce among the states is not confined to transportation,
but comprehends all commercial intercourse between different states and all component parts of
such intercourse. Interstate communications for commercial purposes constitute commerce within
the meaning of the Constitution." 57 F.T.C. at 1544 (citation omitted); accord, Simeon Manage-
ment Corp., 87 F.T.C. 1184, 1213 (1976), enforced, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978); Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 421, 490 (1976), aff'd, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 100
S. CL 1329 (1980); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 85 F.T.C. 601, 662-63 (1975), Surrey Sleep Prods.,
Inc., 73 F.T.C. 523, 553-54 (1968); S. Klein Dep't Stores, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 388, 393-94 (1962), see
Deceptive Advertising, supra note 134, at 1022-23. See generally 1 G. Rosden & P. Rosden, supra
note 135, § 4.03[1]; Sadowski, Broadcasting and State Statutory Laws, 18 J. Broadcasting 433,
434 (1974); see also Bankers Sec. Corp., 57 F.T.C. 1219, 1225 (1960). aff'd, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir.
1961).
148. "[Tihe advertising herein was commercial in every sense of the word, calculated to
increase the profits of [Aetna] by reduction of its costs of operations, to wit, the sums it is
compelled to pay out via jury verdicts." Brief for Appellant at 18, Quinn v. Aetna Life & Cas.
Co., 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); see Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 5
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1153, 1155 (W.D. La. 1979).
149. See 124 Cong. Rec. H3706 (daily ed. May 9, 1978) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce). See also
Kronzer, supra note 71, at 413-15. In addition, these advertisements have much the same effect
as pure corporate image advertisements in that they promote the image of the sponsor. See
Adman, supra note 3, at 70-71; cf. Aetna Ads on Rising Insurance Costs May Tamper With
Juries, Says Court, Bus. Ins., Aug. 7, 1978, at 6 (Aetna has received many "favorable responses"
from its advertisements). See generaly Bird, Goldman & Lawrence, supra note 140, at 406.
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If jury award advertising is an unfair practice in commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act, the FTC has the power to ban the advertisements and may also
have the power to require the insurer-advertisers to present opposing view-
points. The FTC may ban the advertisements either through the issuance of a
cease and desist order or through a trade regulation rule. The cease and desist
order, whereby the FTC orders a named advertiser to discontinue a specific
advertisement,'5"' is the more frequently employed method. 1" Such orders are
initiated by the issuance of a complaint 5 2 and may be challenged in adversary
proceedings. '- 3 Trade regulation rules that define specific acts or practices as
unfair or deceptive, on the other hand, are developed through a substantive
rulemaking process. 154 Although the FTC would normally have wide discretion
to use either method,15 5 it must, when regulating advertisements that contain
more than pure commercial messages, be careful not to impose a prior restraint
on the advertisements' content.1 56
150. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976); see 4 R. Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition Trademarks
and Monopolies § 95.7 (3d ed. 1979).
151. See E. Kintner, supra note 122, at 69; Corporate Image Advertising, supra note 22, at
218.
152. 16 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1980).
153. After the issuance of the complaint, an adversary hearing is held before an administra-
tive law judge (ALJ). Id. §§ 3.41-.46. This proceeding is procedurally similar to a federal court
action. See 4 R. Callman, supra note 150, §§ 95.3-.6(c). The ruling made by the ALJ is called the
"initial decision," 16 C.F.R. § 3.51 (1980), and may be appealed to the full commission by either
the advertiser or the FTC's complaint counsel. Id. § 3.52. If neither party appeals to the full
commission, the determination by the ALJ becomes final and a cease and desist order will issue if
the initial decision went against the advertiser. Id. § 3.51. If the initial decision is appealed to the
full commission, it may affirm, modify or reverse the ruling made by the ALJ. Id, § 3.54. If the
full commission's ruling is against the advertiser, it will issue a cease and desist order. Id. Finally,
the advertiser may appeal the decision of the full commission to a federal court of appeals, which
may then affirm, enforce, modify or set aside the commission's order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(e) (1976).
154. See Statement of Basis, supra note 113, at 8364-73. The formulation of a trade
regulation rule begins with the publication of a proposed rule. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(1) (1976). The
commission is then required to hold a legislative-type hearing on the proposal, id. § 57a(b)(2)-(3),
after which it may formally issue the rule. Id. § 57a(b)(4). Any "interested person" may seek
judicial review of a trade regulation rule within 60 days after it is officially promulgated. Id.
§ 57a(e)(1)(A). Once a trade regulation rule has been issued, it is enforced by issuing a complaint
against the alleged violator. Because the rule has already classified the act or practice as unfair
or deceptive, however, the only issue to be resolved at the hearing is whether the advertiser
committed the prohibited act. See Thain, supra note 117, at 384-85. In this regard, a trade
regulation rule should be distinguished from an "Industry Guide," which is a non-binding
interpretation of the Act. See E. Kintner, supra note 122, at 65-67. See generally 4 R. Callman,
supra note 150, § 95.2(c); 2 G. Rosden & P. Rosden, supra note 135, § 32.04[2][c]; E. Rockefeller,
supra note 144, at 78-80.
155. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683, 726 (1948); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946); Simeon Management
Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 1978); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 23
(7th Cir. 1971); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 661 (1977); Reich, Consumer Protection and the First Amendment: A Dilemma
for the FTC?, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 705 (1977).
156. This consideration is normally absent in FTC actions because the prior restraint doctrine
is inapplicable to pure commercial advertising. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
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A prior restraint may take two forms. It may be either a restraint on speech
prior to its publication' 57 or a restraint on speech prior to a judicial determina-
tion of the constitutionality of the restriction. 'I Because these advertisements
have already been published, any restriction on them, whether by a cease and
desist order or by a trade regulation rule, is outside the first type of prior restraint.
Moreover, because a cease and desist order does not become final until the
appellate review process is complete,'- 9 it is outside the second type of prior
restraint as well. ' 60 In contrast, a trade regulation rule becomes final before
the appellate review process is completed.' 6' It is, therefore, arguably within
the second type of restraint. Because the reviewing court has the power to
grant "interim relief,"' 62 however, the court could stay the enforcement of the
rule, thus remedying its prior restraint deficiency. As between these two
methods of regulation, the cease and desist order, which poses no prior
restraint problems, 63 is the preferable form.
In addition to, and perhaps more important than, its authority to ban adver-
tisements, the FTC may require advertisers to include affirmative disclosures in
their advertisements to prevent unfairness or deception. "I For example, in J. B.
Williams Co. v. FTC, ' 65 the court upheld an FTC order prohibiting Geritol
advertisements that failed to disclose that iron-poor blood was only rarely the
cause of the tiredness symptoms that Geritol claimed to cure. ' 66 It can be argued,
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976); Comment, Prior Restraints and
Restrictions on Advertising after Virginia Pharmacy Board: The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. Rev. 64 (1978).
157. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975); L. Tribe, supra
note 42, § 12-31, at 725.
158. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973); L. Tribe, supra note 42, § 12-31, at 726.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 45(g)-(j) (1976); see Corporate Image Advertising, supra note 22, at 218;
Advertising Perspective, supra note 134, at 465 n. 118. In a limited number of cases, the FTC may
seek an injunction against an advertiser pending a final resolution of the action. is U.S.C. § 53(b)
(1976). For a discussion of the prior restraint problems with such injunctions, see Note, Yes,
FTC, There is a Virginia: The Impact of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. on the Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Misleading Advertis-
ing, 57 B.U.L. Rev. 833, 854-56 (1977); Note, FTC v. Simeon Management Corp.: The First
Amendment and the Need For Preliminary Injunctions of Commercial Speech, 1977 Duke L.J.
489.
160. See Address by Tracy Westen, Deputy Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Brooklyn Law School and Brooklyn Law Review Symposium on Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, at 14 (Nov. 10, 1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
162. Id. § 57a(e)(3).
163. See notes 156-60 supra and accompanying text.
164. See E. Kintner, supra note 122, at 74-76; Comment, Corrective Advertising-The New
Response to Consumer Deception, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 415, 418-19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Consumer Deception].
165. 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
166. Id. at 889-91. Affirmative disclosure orders, as in J.B. Williams, should be carefully
distinguished from corrective advertising orders. In the former, the FTC simply prohibits
future advertisements that it finds unfair or deceptive absent the required disclosure. In contrast,
corrective advertising orders require the advertiser to correct impressions caused by past unfair or
deceptive advertisements. See E. Kintner, supra note 122, at 77-78; Consumer Deception, supra
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therefore, that the insurer-advertisers could be required to present opposing
viewpoints, 167 thereby making their advertisements less one-sided. 168 It should
be noted that the FTC has never employed such a novel approach in an
unfairness action. 169 Nevertheless, such an order would be consistent with the
previously discussed objective of stimulating public debate on topics of public
concern.17 By providing a forum for the presentation of both sides of a con-
troversy, both the amount of information and the diversity of opinions are
increased. Moreover, if disclosure is ordered the FTC would be bound by the
established doctrine of fashioning, when first amendment rights are involved,
the narrowest possible remedy to prevent unfairness or deception. ' 71 Because of
the benefit to the public and the safeguards for the advertisers, therefore, a
regulation requiring some form of affirmative disclosure would be the most
preferable method of FTC regulation.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been increasingly unwilling to restrict
the free flow of valuable information in society.'7 2 At the same time, however,
the Court has refused to afford any form of speech absolute protection, 1 7 3 relying
instead on a more critical balancing analysis. ' 7 4 Under that approach, speech is
subject to regulation if the interest furthered by such regulation outweighs
society's interest in the speech's content.
Because jury award advertising contains important noncommercial speech of
value to society, it should, under this analysis, be restricted only if such restric-
tion would further a compelling state interest. Opponents of the advertisements
note 164, at 419. See generally Note, Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No, Virginia, Wonder
Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 374 (1971); Note,
Corrective Advertising and the Limits of Virginia Pharmacy, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 121 (1979).
167. Because it is normally impractical to require the sponsor to present both sides of a
controversy, see S. Sethi, supra note 3, at 295-96, the advertiser could be required to purchase
and provide advertising space to opponents.
168. See Television Product Advertising, supra note 122, at 530-31.
169. In its proposed trade regulation rule regarding children's advertising, however, the FTC
has proposed affirmative disclosure in separate advertisements, paid for by the children's
advertisers. Notice of Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking and Public Hearing, Children's
Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (1978).
170. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. See also Television Product Advertising,
supra note 122, at 542.
171. See National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F-2d 157, 164 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 489, 644-45
(1978); Roberts, supra note 22, at 145-52; notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text. See generally
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969).
172. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-70 (1976).
173. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49
(1961). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 22, at 720; B. Schwartz,
supra note 39, § 8.1, at 311-12; see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
174. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-43 (1978); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
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have argued that a restriction on the advertisements would further the mainte-
nance of the right to an impartial jury in a civil action. Although such an interest
is arguably a compelling one, there has been no showing to date that the
advertisements pose a substantial threat to that right. This does not mean,
however, that the advertisements are immune from regulation; further and more
extensive research may disclose the existence of the required threat. If so, the
insurer-advertisers should not be allowed to construe the first amendment as
giving them a constitutional right to make an increased profit at the expense of
innocent victims.
Specifically, if further research concludes that the advertisements pose a
serious threat to fair trials, the FTC should regulate the advertising as an
unfair practice. Because a simple ban on the advertisements would suppress
valuable speech as well, the FTC should require the insurer-advertisers to
provide for the presentation of both sides of the controversy. Such a requirement
would eliminate the advertisement's unfairness and at the same time further
society's long-standing interest in promoting "the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."' 75
Bernard J. Rhodes
175. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (quoted in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
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